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AUTHOR Benton, Richard A.
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ABSTRACT

New Zealand education policy has been formed from a combination of nineteenth century liberalism which accepts limited intervention in the education process to ensure equality, and the demands of a capitalist economy which has relied on education to provide a selective function to aid market processes. In a recession, it is this latter function which is emphasized; vocational training is declared to be crucial and the system is governed by competition according to universalistic criteria. These rationalizations conceal the actual basis of selection and encourage the subservience of education to the demands of a depressed economy. In this climate, debates about multiculturalism and education make little sense without giving major consideration to the issue of power, and specifically, the power of minority groups to make and carry through decisions within the institutional structure of society. The critical area for New Zealand is in those urban schools where there are a majority of Polynesian students, many of whom are going to leave school without any or adequate academic qualifications with the obvious implications this has for labor market participation. In discussing multiculturalism, effective equality is constrained by the willingness of dominant groups to grant autonomy and to accede to power sharing. (Author/BRR)

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'TERONG PIPIT GOES TO SCHOOL

Some Thoughts on the Educational and Political Implications of Multilingualism in the School System

A paper prepared for the joint NZARE-NZAARE Seminar on Multiculturalism and Education Held at Massey University 2 December 198[illegible]*

by

Richard A. Benton

New Zealand Council for Educational Research

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INTRODUCTION

> One of the most irritating features of the 'Black Paper' ideology put out by Mr. Rhodes Boyson, Professor Cox, the Institute of Economic Affairs, and other conservatives, is that they say radicals believe in using schools for social engineering while they want to get back to education. This is a verbal trick. It illicitly suggests that there is a choice, which there is not. The reproduction of a generation is always social engineering. The issue is engineering for what? For egalitarians, it is to make a reality of democratic values. For the 'Black Paper' writers, it is social engineering for a society of market liberalism and hierarchy. We should argue these ends and not pretend that the egalitarians are somehow and sinfully introducing corrupting politics into the purity of learning.
> (Halsey, 1978:124).

The role of the school in the reproduction of social differences, and specifically inequality, is now an argument that is well-known. The appearance of the "new" sociology of education at the beginning of the 1970's gave a welcome impetus to the debate on inequality and education through a critical examination of the relationship between the activities of the school and the requirements of the capitalist mode of production. At the beginning of the 1980s, it is appropriate to evaluate what the "new" sociology of education has managed to achieve and to take up Halsey's point concerning the role of the school in producing rather different social conditions, and in particular, to provide a more equitable distribution of social resources and rewards. The concern in this paper is with the inequality that accompanies membership of a racial group in New Zealand, and the role of the school in institutionalising racial disadvantage. A contradiction inevitably arises between the politics and desirability of mass education with the rights and advantages that such education necessarily imparts, and the dynamics of capitalist inequality which involves the integration of various groups into society via their placement in a materially subordinate economic position.

Althusser has observed that the reproduction of labour power takes place more and more outside the production process, and it involves more than simply the inculcation of appropriate skills; it also requires the reproduction of submission:[1]

> ... a reproduction of the submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and oppression
> (Althusser, 1977:128)

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1. The same point is made in various ways by Gramsci, and more recently, Poulantzas, Miliband, Offe and Habermas.

He draws a distinction between the Repressive State Apparatus (R.S.A.) and the Ideological State Apparatuses (I.S.A.'s). The first functions primarily by violence and includes the government, army, police and courts. The second operates "massively and predominantly by ideology" and is characterised by the fact that I.S.A.'s occur in distinct but disparate forms that are "relatively autonomous" in comparison to the tight control of the R.S.A. by elites. The I.S.A.'s are the site of class struggle as well as one of the issues at stake, and "no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses" (Althusser, 1977:139).

Althusser identifies the family and religious institutions as I.S.A.s, but the principal I.S.A. in capitalism is the educational system replacing the religious dominance in feudalism, primarily because of the fact that all children during a critical period of their development are given over to the education system. The conditions of the reproduction of labour are created in this period. It is interesting to note that Althusser, although he has been criticised for quite the opposite (see Finn et al, 1977:145), acknowledges that an exploited class is most likely to find means and occasions to express itself in the I.S.A. (Althusser, 1977:140). The R.S.A., because of its repressive power, does not offer such opportunities.

The details of the way in which the school reproduces inequality (or its class-confirming role, as Miliband (1969) refers to it) and acts as an agent of social control has been provided and popularised by a series of writers other than Althusser. Young, Bourdieu, Boudon and Bernstein (Bates, 1978; Nash, 1982) are names that are now associated with the "new" sociology of education, especially as Young's book, Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education, became a set text, firstly at the Open University and through this, at every teacher training college in the United Kingdom (St. John-Brooks, 1980:443). The insights offered by these writers were adopted with some enthusiasm in various academic and practitioner circles but now the "new" sociology of education is being examined in a much more critical light at the beginning of a decade that promises to be austere in comparison to the 1970s.

Part of the problem in theoretical terms is the necessity of incorporating what is perceived as an autonomous factor, ideology, into a mechanistic tradition that stresses the economic determination of such factors. The tendency is to collapse ideas or ideology into the base. Bourdieu's response is to treat the issue as the "mutual articulation of two discontinuous fields" and to reject the approach that views symbolic relations as a "disguised metaphor for class relations".

> It is <u>because</u> they do symbolic work of a certain kind, that they can function as the articulation of another field - the field of class relations: and hence also do the work of power and domination. (Hall, 1977:29)

A very different issue is the translation of the understanding of the "new" sociology of education into applied strategies. The view of the education system as perpetuating class and other inequalities seemed merely to lock teachers into a determinist bind (St. John-Brooks, 1980:444) and the implications of the new approach were seldom translated into viable options for teacher or administrator. As Bernstein has commented:

> A little Althusser, a little Gramsci, a little Bourdieu, maybe even a sprinkling of Bernstein, won't be enough any more (Bernstein, quoted in St. John-Brooke, 1980:446).

Whether there will be developments that will fulfill these needs remains to be seen[2], but there are two factors which may militate against further progress. The first derives from the understanding generated by the "new" sociology of education which provided a convincing explanation of the role of education in maintaining and reproducing structural relationships. In the circumstances, it is unlikely that the education system is unilaterally able to challenge or alter the existing structural arrangements without major alterations to the nature of capitalism also occurring. The education system cannot be expected to make an impact in a free market situation where the driving force is profit and self-interest (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979:122) and where education is an integral part of state control as in U.S.A.

The second factor involves the vastly different political and economic climate of the 1980s. The political conservatism apparent in Europe and North America combined with a continuing economic recession have helped shift awareness and concern away from structural-institutional arrangements back to individual motivation and performance. Needless to say, sociologists of education who suggest otherwise are unlikely to gain research resources or access to policy-making levels. Nash (1982) notes that politicians and educational administrators in New Zealand have backed away from any contemplation of reform. In the circumstances, the "new" sociologists of education may be overtaken by events and their contribution ignored as a result of a conservative climate that is not amenable to criticism or concerned to provide more resources at a period when they are seeking to reduce state expenditure.

But if these factors, and others, may retard the development of the "new" sociology of education, the progress that has been achieved so far cannot be lightly dismissed. It may also produce new and more effective alliances. The possibility arises through the abandonment of the class-neutral stance of the state and the clear evidence of dominant group views on inequality during an economic recession, that the victims may arrive at a new level of consciousness and politicisation. Of the three major subordinate groups in New Zealand - the working class, women and Polynesians - the latter two, at least, have mounted a critical survey of the role of education system in reproducing the relations of production. In the face of more obvious disadvantage that is apparent during a recession, there is an incentive to adopt a more critical perspective and political action. Thus, if the "new" sociology of education is unable to offer much in a practical sense to teachers and administrators, the disadvantaged groups may be in a somewhat different position, if only by virtue of the fact that they have nothing to lose. It provides them with an analysis of the processes of capitalism and the way in which the education system serves to incorporate and subjugate specific groups. The racism that is apparent in the educational disadvantage of Polynesians becomes a major item on the political agenda, and minority groups become willing to adopt a critical stance. The last section of this paper will attempt to identify the various options open to Polynesians. Prior to that, there is a brief survey of the educational disadvantage of Polynesians and the various policies generated to respond to this disadvantage.

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2. In the New Zealand context, the 'new' sociology of education is providing a useful area of debate as it is applied to indigenous conditions(see Harker,1981 and Nash,1982). This area of sociology might not be constrained to the same extent as has occurred in Britain, despite Nash's(1982)prognosis, and there is already evidence of highly critical studies of the relationship between education and capitalism in New Zealand (see Freeman-Moir,1980).

THE POLITICS OF STATISTICS

The subsequent brief analysis of the educational performance and demographic characteristics of Polynesians needs to be preceded by an acknowledgement of the difficulties associated with the use of official statistics in New Zealand. Apart from the fact that certain types of statistics are simply not available, there is also a reluctance on the part of some individuals and agencies to collect statistics on ethnic groups. This attitude can be described as representing an ideological position to the extent that it 'presupposes the experience of a societal condition which has already become problematic and therefore requires a defense' (Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, 1973:139). It is a characteristic of New Zealand that many people use physical differences as a basis for classifying others into a racial group, and as a result, patterns of prejudice and discrimination occur which create barriers against Polynesians (and others). It is equally common to deny that any such disadvantage does take place and that there are serious racial problems. Hence, in reply to a question as to whether statistics were collected on the Polynesian unemployed, the Minister of Labour replied in Parliament that:

> As ethnic origin should play no part in determining a person's acceptability as an employee, no information is sought or collected by the Department of Labour on the number of Maoris and Pacific Island Polynesians who are unemployed (Hansard, 1979:4883).

In fact, these statistics were collected by the Department of Labour in the past but when they were released (for 1967-1968), it was found that Polynesians constituted 31.6 percent of the registered unemployed (Rosenburg, 1977:49). In the field of education, statistics are not kept for Pacific Islanders so there is little opportunity to establish their level of educational performance. Nor is there information in a number of crucial areas. For instance, the Department of Education does not keep records of the ethnic origin of secondary school pupils who are suspended or expelled (Hansard, 1979:4873).

The frequent comment by those opposed to the collection of such statistics is that it represents discrimination on racial grounds which is somewhat ironical given the fact that the statistics represent an attempt to document existing disadvantage. Even if the statistics were available, and that they clearly displayed evidence of discrimination, it is not inevitable that policies to combat these problems would follow. The area of debate would simply take place on different issues. For the moment,

the concern is with the generation of appropriate statistics.

The other major problem with the New Zealand statistics are the various definitions of Maori that are employed. Until 1974, the Department of Statistics relied on a traditional 'biological' definition of Maori. In this case, the category consisted of people who could claim half or more Maori 'blood'. In other areas, the criteria employed was rather less confined. The Maori Education Foundation Act (1961), for example, included any descendant of a Maori. In 1974, the government decided to standardise the definition for administrative purposes and the Maori Affairs Amendment Act (1974) added to the 'half or more' definition the clause, or a 'descendant of such a person'. The following year, the Electoral Act (1975) went further and declared that a Maori is anyone who elects to be considered as such. The move is towards self-definition which is more appropriate in terms of a group identification and affiliation. Nevertheless, problems arise. The census material is still offered in terms of the half or more definition of Maori. This produces a New Zealand total in the 1976 census of those who declared themselves to be 50 percent or more Maori descent of 270,035, whereas the broader definition which allows for descendants of the Maori 'race', provides a figure of 356,847. The census statistics used here derive from the first, and smaller, figure.

The other discrepancy arises from the fact the Department of Education statistics which are used to provide the data on educational performance are compiled from returns that have been provided by school principals. They are asked to indicate pupils of half or more Maori 'blood'. There are major differences between statistics from this source and the data collected in the census. In 1970, the number of Maori children in the 5 to 9 age group recorded as being at school was seventeen and a half percent greater than the number estimated in this age group by the Government Statistician (Butterworth, 1974). And the Department of Education statistics for a specific age group for the Maori population are usually 7-8 percent greater than the same figures collected in the census (McDonald, 1976:39). Those problems should be borne in mind in the next section.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

The significant demographic characteristics of the Maori population in the post war period result from their continuing migration and concentration in specific urban areas and their relatively high rate of population increase. Prior to the War in 1936, only 10.02 percent of the Maori population lived in a city or a borough. After the War, the Department of Maori Affairs began a policy of encouraging Maoris to migrate to urban areas and by 1956, the effects of this policy were seen in the fact that 24.37 percent of the Maori population lived in a city or a borough.

The percentage has continued to rise so that by 1956, slightly over half the Maori population was now resident in urban areas and by 1976, it had risen to 76.2 percent. The related aspect is the concentration in particular cities. In 1945, only one out of every 20 Maoris lived in the Auckland urban area. By 1976, nearly one in four (22.3 percent) of the Maori population were living in Auckland. This relocation is underlined by the higher population growth rates for the Maori population than is the case for the remainder of the population. The intercensual increase for the total population between 1966 and 1971 was 6.94 percent, and 9.35 percent between 1971 and 1976. The equivalent Maori percentage increases are 13.1 percent and 18.7 percent respectively. The impact of the concentration and the continuing high growth rates are reflected in Table 1 which illustrates the Maori element in Auckland's population.

TABLE 1 Total and Maori Population All Age Groups and 5-14 Years of Age in Auckland Urban Area and South Auckland, 1971 - 1976.

	1971			1976		
	Total Population	Maori No.	% of Total	Total Population	Maori No.	% of Total
AUCKLAND						
All Age Groups	649,758	45,777	7.05	743,622	60,110	8.9
5-14 Years of Age	130,176	13,759	10.57	145,076	17,865	12.32
SOUTH AUCKLAND						
Urban Area:						
5-14 Years of Age	41,274	6,909	16.74	50.924	9,945	19.53

Source: New Zealand Census, 1971 and 1976.

The Maori as a percent of the total Auckland population went from 7.05 percent in 1971 to 8.9 percent in 1976. The equivalent percentages for the population between 5 and 14 years of age were 10.57 percent and 12.32 percent. However, the Maori population is not evenly spread throughout Auckland's four statistical areas. The principal concentration is in South

Auckland and here the Maori youth (5-14 years) constituted 16.74 percent of the total population (5-14 years of age) in 1971 and 19.53 percent in 1976. To these figures have to be added the Pacific Island Polynesian population, and in 1976, Pacific Islanders added another 14,487 to the Maori population in South Auckland. This means that 30.13 percent of the population in this part of Auckland was Polynesian, and it constituted an even higher proportion of the youth in this area. The implications for education are obvious. Throughout New Zealand, Maori pupils make up 15.2 percent of the primary and secondary school population in 1980 (12.6 percent in 1970), while in schools in Otara in South Auckland, 85 percent and more of the roll is now Polynesian (Ramsay, 1981:33).

For 1979, Ramsey et al (1981) report that 50 percent of enrolments in Mangere and 74 percent of enrolments in Otara schools were deemed to be Polynesian. This concentration is equalled and sometimes exceeded by schools in other selected areas of Auckland, producing problems for the education system. A significant problem, both in these areas and throughout New Zealand, is the underachievement of the Polynesian pupil, especially with regard to the formal credentials that are held to be a critical part of the rites of passage for every New Zealander.

The functional differentiation of labour that has accompanied industrialisation in New Zealand has built upon established inequalities. One such area of inequality is based on race, and a central part of the State apparatus in the establishment and perpetuation of this form of unequal participation is the education system. In the initial contact between Pakeha and Maori, the education system, even in its rudimentary stages, represented a form of colonialism that Furniss (1976) has labelled co-opting imperialism. Typically, this resulted in the subjugation of the linguistic and cultural traditions of the group at the periphery of the developing capitalist mode of production, the Maori. This ensured that the social attributes that were identified as desirable were firstly possessed by selected members of the Pakeha community, and that secondly, these skills could be dispensed to peripheral groups as part of the reward system of capitalism. The school has not only been a critical instrument in undermining the importance of traditional institutions and behaviour but it has been a central part of the State system for elite recruitment or more generally, participation in the

economy. As the functional differentiation of labour has grown more complex, the education system has had to become more selective and correspondingly more complex in its selection processes. This development or the complexity can not be examined here, but at a basic level, it is worthwhile examining the Maori performance in obtaining the credentials considered fundamental to the system of selection. These credentials are critical to obtaining access to the occupational structure, particularly at a time of economic recession when employment opportunities are greatly reduced.

Firstly, an examination of those leaving school without any attainments shows the disproportionate number of Maoris who contribute to this figure. Table 2 indicates a substantial decrease in the number of Maoris who fall into this category, but the equivalent decrease for non-Maoris surpasses that for Maoris producing an increasing gap between the two groups. In the fifteen year period covered by the table, the gap grew by 9.27 percent. Given the fact that even School Certificate passes are a minimal qualification in a restricted job market and are increasingly unable to provide any sort of a guarantee of job success, the growing gap means that the Maori are collectively less competitive on the job market. They represent a growing percentage of all those who leave school without any qualifications. In 1970, the Maori constituted 21.14 percent of this category, and by 1980, they represented 28.23 percent of those leaving school without attainment. In fact, on closer examination for particular secondary school forms, the Maori percentage is even more illustrative. In 1980, Maoris made up 37.2 percent of those who left secondary school in form three, and 33.6 percent for forms 3, 4 and 5.

At the other end of the scale as far as secondary schools are concerned, the figures for those who leave with University Entrance or higher qualifications illustrate a similar trend to the one discussed above. That is, while the Maori attainment rate has improved, the rate for non-Maoris has improved relatively more. Table 3 shows that the gap between 1963 and 1978 has grown by 10.8 percent, so that the Maori is again not making any relative gains and as a result, is less able to compete with the rest of the population. The Non-Maori is four times more likely to gain University Entrance or a higher examination. It is some consolation that the number of Maoris proceeding to further full-time education has improved relative to other sections of the population (see Table 4). For both Maori and Non-Maori groups, the numbers going to university increased at approximately the same rate, although the percentage of Maoris going to university is still well behind the same percentage for the rest of the population. With regard to other full-time education, which includes

8.27

TABLE 2 Proportion of Non-Maori and Maori Pupils leaving without Attainment, 1963-1978

	1963 %	1968 %	1973 %	1978 %
Non-Maori	64.33	41.11	35.6	28.53
Maori	93.6	79.02	73.5	67.07
Difference	29.27	37.9	37.9	38.54

Source: Calculated from the Department of Education, 1964 - 1979.

teacher training and attendance at technical college, the Maori increase is apparent with only a slight rise in the comparative percentage for Non-Maoris. A major reason for this is the effect of official policies in encouraging Maoris to attend technical college, and in the 1980 figures, 70 percent of those going onto further full-time education fell into this category. On the surface at least, some ground has been made up in this area, although whether it will be translated into appropriate job attainment has yet to be seen and the effect of the proposed cuts to teacher training may yet reduce the gains made in the last decade.

TABLE 3 Proportion of School Leavers with University Entrance or Higher Qualifications, 1963-1978.

	1963 %	1968 %	1073 %	1978 %
Non-Maori	15.8	22.9	26.7	31.7
Maori	1.8	2.6	4.3	6.9
Difference	14.0	20.3	22.4	24.8

Source: Calculated from Department of Education, 1963 - 1979.

Overall, the official figures show that while the Maori achievement rate at school has increased, the gain has not been as great as that made by the Non-Maori population. On a comparative basis, the Maori is increasingly less competitive in the job market in terms of the formal qualifications to be gained from the school. This is borne out by Table 5 which shows the highest formal educational qualifications of Maoris and Non-Maoris in those age groups where they enter the labour force. The table suggests that the younger Maori who is born and educated in the urban areas is unable to compete much more effectively than their migrant parents. The table also underlines a point that has been made a number of times

above: the relative figures are getting worse, not better, and the Maori continues to fall behind similar achievement rates for Non-Maoris. (The figures for 1976 are not available for a similar assessment because the census did not ask the same question).

TABLE 4 Proportion of Pupils leaving Secondary School whose Intending Destination is University or Other Full-Time Education, 1970-1980.

Group	Destination	1970 %	1970 Combined	1980 %	1980 Combined
Non-Maori	University	12.83	22.04	12.26	22.79
	Other Full-Time Education	9.21		10.53	
Maori	University	1.55	4.86	2.6	10.36
	Other Full-Time Education	3.31		7.76	

Source: Calculated from Department of Education, 1971-1981.

TABLE 5 The Highest Formal Educational Qualification of Maoris and Non-Maoris Aged 15 to 74 in the Labour Force, 1966-1971.

Year		No Qualification	Secondary Qualification[1]	University Qualification	Maori/Non-Maori Disparity MCR[2]
1966	Maori	94.6	5.3	0.1	0.21
	Non-Maori	74.1	24.6	1.3	
1971	Maori	88.6	11.3	0.1	0.30
	Non-Maori	58.5	39.1	2.4	

1 This category includes those with a Teacher's Certificate but with no university qualification.

2 MCR - Mean Cost Rating. It provides an index of disparity between Maori and Non-Maori achievement levels, whereby 0 would represent complete equality and higher values representing the level of difference.

Source: Fifield and Donnell, 1980: 35.

It is useful to complete this statistical view of Maori educational performance by briefly examining other indicators of the Maori position in New Zealand society, particularly as it has already been noted that the school represents and perpetuates broader social processes. The disparity between Maori and Non-Maori that is apparent in the figures on education is replicated in the statistics for employment (Spoonley, 1982), income (Macpherson, 1977) and residential distribution (Trlin, 1979). In employment, the Maori and Pacific Island Polynesian are overwhelmingly concentrated in the category 'Production, Transport, Equipment Operators and Labourers' while they are under-represented in the professional, managerial and skilled white collar jobs. To gain an equivalent occupational distribution to Non-Polynesians, three out of ten Maoris and four out of ten Pacific Islanders who are active in the labour force would need to change jobs. A similar figure is apparent with ethnic distribution by industry where the level of industrial segregation is in the order of 26.1 percent (Moir, 1977:103). The situation is exacerbated by the high levels of unemployment for the Maori population, particularly with regard to youth rates of unemployment. Based on the 1976 census, the following table illustrates this point although it should also be acknowledged that the figures are somewhat out of date. More recently, the Department of Planning and Community Development, Auckland City Council (1980) conducted a survey of central Auckland. Maoris comprised 6.1 percent and Pacific Islanders 6.3 percent of the survey sample (n=1670). But they constituted 17.0 percent (Maori) and 14.1 percent (Pacific Islander) of the unemployed.

TABLE 6 Unemployed as a Percentage of Actively Engaged*

Age	Maori	Non-Maori	Total
MALES			
15	29.7	11.3	14.9
16	18.3	5.8	7.6
17	11.7	3.7	4.6
18	9.3	2.9	3.7
19	8.0	2.7	3.3
15-19	12.5	3.9	4.9
FEMALES			
15	43.4	16.0	21.8
16	31.5	9.7	12.8
17	24.9	6.3	8.2
18	18.9	5.2	6.5
19	15.4	4.2	5.2
15-19	24.1	6.2	8.1

Working 20 or more hours weekly.

Source: Labour and Employment Gazette, 1980:11
(Based on 1976 census).

It is inevitable that Polynesians will conflict with agencies of social control. As one instance, the rate of appearance before children's and youth aid is 272.14 per 1000 for the Maori while the equivalent rate for the Non-Maori is 54.98. Between 1964 and 1974, the Maori rate increased by 176 percent compared with an increase for Non-Maoris of 79.6 percent (Fifield and Donnell, 1980:5). Similar material is available for a variety of other indices and indicates the marginal social and economic position of the Polynesian in New Zealand. The issue which now arises is whether the school can hope to effect change for a group that is considered to be seriously underachieving in terms of the expectations of the dominant Pakeha society. The immediate concern is with the educational system itself in an attempt to alter the educational performance of Polynesians, but there is also a tradition of policy and argument that asserts that the school is capable of effecting broader social and economic change, partly because of its role as a channel of mobility and partly in its role in exposing the central and false myths of a society. If experience elsewhere is a guide, then racial attitudes and discrimination, like those related to class and sex, may prove to be an intractable problem and resistant to change except in peripheral areas that are unimportant to the major institutions of a capitalist society.

THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY

The previous section indicates something of the educational inequality that occurs with regard to Polynesian groups in New Zealand, and supports the contention that the education system operates to confirm structural inequality. But the education system is also popularly viewed as an important part of welfare state policy, and since the 1930s, governments of various political persuasions have affirmed their faith in the potential of the welfare state to achieve equality between disparate groups. The strategies of the welfare state are held to be the most appropriate means of redressing social inequality by redistributing the unfair allocation of life chances that arise from the processes of the free market situation. Inevitably, contradictions are apparent between the stated intention of using the education system to equalise opportunity and to eliminate racial disadvantage, and the role of the education system as an ISA in reproducing the relations of production. The special programmes that are intended to contribute to educational equality between Polynesian and Pakeha have taken various forms, primarily within the education system although more recently, the Department of Maori Affairs have also developed certain strategies.

(I) Department of Education.

There has always been an identifiable "Maori" policy within the education system. As it was noted above, initially this policy was designed as part of the attempt to denigrate and reduce the significance of Maori culture, especially with regard to the Maori language. Later in the nineteenth century, due to the decimation of the Maori population, the aim of the schools was to help assimilate what was expected to be the remaining survivors amongst the Maori into Pakeha society. Legislation such as the 1867 Native Schools Act was to help this absorption, and up until the 1930s, the emphasis was on the inculcation of European notions of hygiene and acceptable behaviour along with rudimentary academic skills. This was intended to equip Maori boys for menial agricultural work and the girls for domestic labour. There were exceptions to this very limiting approach. Te Aute College, under the guidance of John Thornton, tried to establish an environment that would impart more advanced skills, and Barrington (1966) cites the organising inspector for schools, J. Pope, as a progressive and sympathetic educator. But even in these cases, Pope was known to view Maori language as an anachronism (Walker, 1978) and Te Aute produced a new group of Maori leaders at the beginning of this century who exhorted the Maori 'to do violence to their own identity' (Reeves, 1979:3).

A change in educational policy towards Maoris began in the 1930s and 1940s, particularly with the support of D.S. Ball, Senior Inspector in the Education Department, but the watershed came in the post World War II period when Maoris became even more incorporated into capitalist society as a result of urban migration. The first major acknowledgement that there was substantial inequality between Maori and Pakeha was made in 1960 in the Hunn Report. This was followed with reference to education, by the 1967 NZEI report on Maori education, a 1970 PPTA report, the 1971 report by the National Advisory Committee on Maori Education, its 1980 equivalent, He Huarahi, produced by the same committee, and the 1981 NZEI and PPTA reports on Maori education and multicultural education. All represent an acknowledgement if not a detailed inventory of Maori educational inequality. The 1971 and 1981 reports from the National Advisory Committee on Maori Education both accept that special measures need to be taken to achieve any sort of inequality, and they suggest in some detail what measures should be implemented. With each of these reports, there has been a comment to the effect that equality is desirable and that special measures need to be explored to achieve parity between Maori and Pakeha. And yet, in the twenty years since the Hunn Report, the gap has grown between Maori and Pakeha in terms of educational attainments, a fact that reports like He Huarahi gloss over.

The provisions that have been implemented in the last twenty years take a variety of forms but they are primarily represented by changes to the curriculum and the provision of special teaching facilities. In the curriculum, the fundamental change has come in the promotion of Maori language and culture at both primary and secondary levels. In 1970, 30 secondary schools taught Maori to 2,318 pupils. By 1979, 182 schools taught it to 14,759 pupils (Hansard 1980:2661). In addition, another 9000 take Maori and Polynesian studies at secondary school. This has two possible roles. It may teach both Maori and Pakeha something of Maori culture and to contribute to a more tolerant climate, although there is nothing to suggest a causal relationship between the two. Secondly, the teaching of Maori may provide an academic subject that will help Maori success. In fact, the format used in teaching Maori has been criticised as inappropriate (Harker, 1981). And the end result might bear out this criticism. In 1980, there were 1792 School Certificate entries for Maori language and 700 passed giving a pass rate of 39.07%, compared with an equivalent pass rate for English of 51.07% or 57.24% for History. Harker (1981:43) comments that it is not so much the content which is important but the way in which it is organised and its status, and with regard to both these points, Maori language instruction would appear to offer little to the Maori student. One teacher (Mr. B. Gadd) has actually argued that School Certificate 'is a conscious design to fail Maori and Polynesians' (Auckland Star, 8 August 1978).

One other important policy position is the provision of additional facilities to those schools which have a large number of Polynesian pupils. Under the Secondary School Grants Regulation (1974), schools with 30 percent or more Maoris on their roll qualify for additional assistance in terms of general expenses. Each Maori student is held to represent 1.2 students. An extensive survey of the success of these notional roll schools has been carried out and the report (Ramsay et al, 1981) recommends the retention and extension of such additional programmes, although the point is strongly made that such assistance is insufficient by itself and that a series of other factors need to be examined and responded to. They also comment:

> The overall conclusion reached is that the policies developed by governments have been ad hoc in nature. They do not appear to have been based on any carefully thought out development plan...(Ramsay et al, 1981:29).

In terms of actually producing tangible results, the various policies appear to have been unable to alter the situation faced by Maoris within the educational system, essentially because meaningful reform would require substantial alteration to the practice and aims of education. The major departures have occured in the encouragement of fully bilingual schools.

Ruatoki provided the pilot programme beginning in 1977, and 3 more schools have now joined this move. Some are concerned with language retention, others with language revival. All are almost exclusively Maori and located in rural areas. The test of how committed politicians and educators are to providing viable alternatives to Maori pupils comes when they are faced by the proposal to establish similar primary schools in major urban areas and to extend bilingualism to secondary schools. Already, the Minister of Maori Affairs has announced his opposition to the teaching and use of Maori in schools (Hansard, 1980:3935), and wider opposition, especially from various employer associations, could be expected. An indication of this opposition is provided by the debate over affirmative action programmes.

Limited affirmative action programmes in education have existed for some time. The longest operating programme has been in the medical schools which began an entry preference scheme for Polynesians in 1951 at Otago University. The Auckland Medical School began a similar scheme in 1972. Both schemes are concerned primarily with boosting the number of Polynesians in the medical degree, although even where the preference scheme does apply, high academic attainment is still a prerequisite and there is no allowance made for the students once they have been accepted. Thus, the Auckland University Vice-Chancellor felt it necessary to affirm publicly that the prime interest was in academic standards and the need to increase the numbers of Polynesian students was a secondary if important consideration (Herald, 20 November 1973).

A more impressive scheme is the affirmative action programme run by the University of Auckland, mainly because it encompasses a variety of cultural and social considerations. The concern at Auckland University began when it was realised that only about 10 percent of the Maori school leavers who should have been at Auckland University actually arrived there (Auckland Star, 5 May 1978). They began a programme to liase with Maori communities within the university's catchment and to offer various supportive services once the students were at the university. The result has been a major increase in the Polynesian students attending Auckland University.

Number of Polynesians Attending Auckland University.

	Maori	Pacific Islander
1977	193	61
1978	254	116
1979	339	155
1980	364	196

'Source: University of Auckland Sub-Committee, 1980:4 .

It also needs to be pointed out that despite such advances, Maori and Pacific Island students still only comprise 4 percent of paper enrolments (they would need to more than double to approach the proportion of Polynesians in the general population who are of university age) and the pass-rates are lower than those for the student-body as a whole (Higher Education Research Office, 1979). The scheme at Auckland University would seem to offer some improvement within limits. But an interesting aspect is the response to any alteration to the exclusiveness and meritocracy that has marked educational selection in the past. It brings into question the nature of education and its relationship to capitalist relations of production. Inevitably, any suggestion that education should deviate from its role as subservient to economic interests provokes a strong reaction.

The counter-arguments to affirmative action programmes indicate something of the nature of education in a capitalist society and highlight earlier comments about the nature of ideology. The arguments take various forms. Firstly, the New Zealand myth that equality of opportunity already exists and that there is access to education for everyone is often stated. Secondly, there is a commitment to the principles of a meritocratic approach, and that the best person, regardless of race, should advance through the system. Thirdly, it is often argued that racial divisions are dangerous in that they create divisions and exacerbate conflict (these arguments appear in statements by J.K. Dobson, President, New Zealand Employers' Federation, and J. Busfield, Vice-President, Auckland Chamber of Commerce, Herald, 5 July 1978). A common argument is that 'we're all New Zealanders" and racial matters are not or should not be important. In this context, it seems unreasonably to suggest that majority group practices and institutions operate to disadvantage Polynesian groups, and that institutions and practices which recognise the separate needs of Polynesians are anomalous and at variance with the dominant ideology. Thus, one editorial argued that positive discrimination was most likely to cause racial tension rather than to alleviate it.

> Two wrongs can hardly put matters right; to initiate special preference for any group in our multi-racial society is to discriminate against someone else, no matter how worthy the cause (Herald, 5 July, 1978).

Dr. Paewai (Herald, 4 April 1975) has criticised the call by "educated Maoris" for more advantages on the grounds that these advantages are unfair. For this section of the community, the universalism of a meritocratic approach and the demands of a capitalist market cannot be compromised by affirmative action. There is an unwillingness to admit that racial inequality is a problem and an acceptance that the market is capable of ensuring a just distribution of social

goods. Recently, a section of conservative political opinion has even moved away from welfare state intervention and that schools should be completely guided by market demands(see Graham, New Zealand Times, 8 November 1981). This is accompagnied by concern at 'reverse racism' which apparently benefits Polynesians unfairly and is a point of annoyance to Pakehas(see Couch, Evening Post, 12 May 1981).Even in the limited affirmative action programme run by the University of Auckland, a number of schools approached by the university refused "to cooperate on the grounds that such a programme is separatist and racist"(Sub-Committee,1980:app.2).

(ii)Tu Tangata

These criticisms have also been expressed in relation to the aggressive policy that has been adopted in recent years by the Department of Maori Affairs and which is entitled Tu Tangata. The Tu Tangata programme, in essence, attempts to instil ethnic pride and confidence primarily through the creation of positive role models and the identification of business and employment opportunities. For example, in 1979, a scheme was initiated which involved"successful" Maoris and Pacific Islanders in a tour of secondary schools which had significant numbers of Polynesians. The intention was to identify and encourage promising pupils and to brief Polynesians on employment prospects. Another scheme run under the Tu Tangata programme has been to arrange visits for urban Polynesian youngsters to rural marae so that they are acquainted with traditional values and practices. The Department also runs or arranges various job training programmes. These are now quite extensive and in 1981, the Department will guarantee job training or placement for about a third of Maori school leavers. This means places for 2200 Maoris in work skills programmes, public service training, computer programming and pre-apprenticeship schemes. The cost is $6 million(Evening Post, 30 September 1981). It is not coincidental that the growth of such schemes parallels the increased employments difficulties of Polynesians. The massive effort of the Tu Tangata programme acts as a safety valve by softening and redirecting resentment and hostility that accompanies educational failure and rejection or difficulties in the labour market, and which might otherwise be directed at the system of exploitation.

There are many aspects of the Tu Tangata programme which are positive and supportive of the Maori but there are also fundamental weaknesses. The first problem is that there is no attempt to address the problem of majority group racism or institutional racism, but rather the intention,in most cases, is to equip the Maori for involvement and

intention, in most cases, is to equip the Maori for involvement and active participation in a capitalist society. The programme aims at encouraging skills that are appropriate in the labour market or helping to establish Maori-run businesses especially in the small business or horticultural sector. The assumption is that successful role models will encourage other Maoris and help produce tolerance. It is only possible to speculate at the reaction if the Tu Tangata programme was to mount a major attack on dominant attitudes and institutions, but there must be little doubt that there would be political pressure to curtail Tu Tangata. The second point, which also applies to the various cultural programmes that are apparent in the education system, is the lack of fit in many cases between the aspirations and attitudes of the urban-born generations of Polynesians and the values that are emphasised in the traditional Maori milieu which are continued by older generations. There are now many young Polynesians whose identification with their tribal or island group is minimal and whose life experience has been that of an urban working class. In this context, traditional values are often seen as irrelevant. The challenge to institutions like the education system is more likely to come from this quarter, and the type of political activity that is adopted and the demands made of the education system will be very different from the policies that are part of Department of Education and Department of Maori Affairs practise.

MINORITY GROUP STRATEGIES

Polynesians have been critical of the education system in the past. As one Maori commentator noted:

> If prizes were awarded for statements of best intentions or high-sounding promises, announcements on Maori education would win hands down(Truth,14 November 1978).

Even when the bilingual school at Ruatoki was established, local comment reflected cynicism when they addressed [illegible] the Director of Maori and Islands education:

> Alan Smith, your department 10-20 years ago told us not to speak Maori in schools.Now you say our kids can do well by speaking Maori;is this another trick being played? (Ussher, 1981:16).

There has been pressure for change in the education system from Maoris, and some of the suggestions have been incorporated into State policy, but given the obvious limitations of government departments in seriously altering the existing structural inequalities, political initiatives may well come from the minority groups. There are three broad strategies thatare open to them(Miles and Phizacklea,1977). The first is for minority groups to become incorporated into the class structure of the host society so that the issues and problems that they face become identified in class terms rather than in racial or ethnic terms. The second strategy involves organisation along ethnic lines with the aim of improving conditions for a specific ethnic group rather than for all Polynesians. And the third possibility is a unity based on colour in response to Pakeha racism.

In the context of this paper, the first strategy should be the most obvious. In fact, class analysis and solutions seem unlikely given the fact that class polarisation and consciousness are underdeveloped in New Zealand. A Polynesian who seeks class support is unlikely to be impressed by the response. The class organisations that do exist such as the trade union movement have done very little to improve conditions for the Polynesian even in the workplace, and although relations between Polynesian and trade unions are cordial,Polynesians are more likely to look elsewhere for their particular views to be represented. The majority of the Polynesian population appear to prefer community based organisations which operate as the functional equivalent of the trade union movement but with an ethnic or racial orientation rather than a class one.

The third strategy is based on a coalition of all Polynesians in response to the disadvantages that accompany a brown skin in New Zealand. There seems to be more grounds for suggesting that this may be a preferred strategy compared to class-based action. The level of prejudice and discrimination in New Zealand combined with low educational attainment and poor occupational status could provide the impetus for Polynesians to identify as one group. There are historical reasons why this may not occur. There is a clear distinction drawn between Maori and Pacific Islander which is exacerbated by the fact that they compete for similar resources. And most Pacific Islanders, because of the recency of their migration and the still considerable links with their respective homelands retain a strong cultural identity. But the common experience of having been educated and socialised in an urban environment and in close proximity to one another may overcome this traditional reluctance to combine. Mana Motuhake is one indication that is likely to occur.

Mana Motuhake represents a split between the aims and objectives of the Maori community and a party that has traditionally claimed to represent Maori interests. It therefore represents an organisation that seeks to enter the political arena directly and to by-pass the longstanding reliance on the Labour Party. The difficulty for Mana Motuhake is to attract and justify support while operating within the constraints of the political system. Or it could consciously decide to opt out of involvement and cooperation with the institutions of a dominant Pakeha society.

The future for the movement appears to be good if it can harness the political frustrations of the urban Polynesian. The young Polynesians who lack an affinity with the traditional cultural values of their group and the opportunity to immerse themselves in a cultural setting that would provide them with that identity, are looking for new symbols that mark their defensive position in a society which confronts them with the ascriptive importance of their colour. Hence, the so-called 'gangs' along with various other imported identities including American black power and West Indian rastafarian cultures. It is the younger generation who because of their low human capital are disproportionately affected by the current recession, but who have also been educated within an urban industrial setting with the materialist expectations that accompany this background. Their frustration is critical to their attitude towards Mana Motuhake and should encourage support for the group from Polynesians under 30 years of age. In return, Mana Motuhake have acknowledged the racial basis of disadvantage and offered a critical analysis of New Zealand

society. In the area of education, Mana Motuhake tend to focus on language and they argue that Maori should be an integral part of the curriculum of all primary and secondary schools and that it should have an academic standing. They are committed to attaining equal status between Maori and English. One indication of feeling on the matter of education came at the Waikato-Maniapoto Maori Planning Conference(1981) where the Mana Motuhake speaker argued that Maoris must turn the education system around by setting up alternative schools that would 'work for them'. The response from the Maori Affairs representative was to suggest that

> Maori parents must ignore accusations of racism and form support groups to get their children through the school system(Evening Post, 5 October 1981).

Historically, the notion of a separate Maori education system has been practised but without Maori control. It would have little effect and might be counterproductive if such a system was to be established without other changes in society also taking place. It is interesting to note, that in a regional seminar in Hamilton in 1944, one recommendation was to form a Maori university as the apex of a Maori education system that would be responsive to Maori needs. The evidence that is available suggests that schools that do have a Maori tradition tend to produce better results(Harker, 1981) and there is the obvious advantage in the Mana Motuhake candidates proposal of a Maori system of schooling of political control.

The second strategy that is available to Polynesians is to organise on an ethnic basis. This means the continuing dependence and affiliation with the traditional institutions of a particular ethnic group. An ethnic group will have a series of structures ranging from kin-based groups to more elaborate and extensive church or collectively based organisations. Faced by restricted access to jobs, housing, welfare services or other resources, these organisations help group members resolve problems, normally by circumventing them rather than by confrontation. The more competent the group is in solving these problems, then the more likely it is to retain the younger members of the community and to convince them that it is in their interest to stay with the ethnic group. In educational terms, this strategy could mean the establishment of classes outside the formal education system to continue ethnic traditions and languages. These classes have been established for a variety of ethnic groups including the Chinese, Jews, Greeks and Indians. But Polynesians have only rarely produced equivalent systems, partly because learning of this sort is undertaken in a different way

and partly due to the dislocation that accompanies migration. It is much more likely that the host society will establish institutions for learning Polynesian culture and languages.

This strategy has been the most important in the past, and it has generally been characterised by a relatively non-political role in terms of challenging the dominant Pakeha society or institutions. With few exceptions, ethnic organisations have been unwilling to oppose the policies pursued by government departments. This may have been a product of the rural location of the Maori population up until the War, but it also clear that this position has now changed . The urban educated generations have internalised at least some of the values and expectations held by the host community, and problems increase as Polynesians become aware that these expectations will seldom be realised because racial factors 'disqualify'them from free competition within the education system and the labour market. Some of the tension will be moderated by the accommodation of the Polynesian middle class into the institutions of the dominant Pakeha society(eg Department of Maori Affairs). If those organisations based on specific ethnic communities can adopt a greater political profile and encompass the needs of the urban-born generations, then it will ensure that these organisations retain a central role in representing Polynesian concerns. Their failure, however, would leave the way open to a strategy that centres on race. The young Polynesian would forge an alliance with other Polynesians and to argue for their collective concerns. This might have the same effect as class-based action to the extent that it is highly political and designed to attack the weak points of capitalist domination. A central question is the willingness of the dominant groups to grant power, in this case over the education process, to Polynesians. The intuitive response would be to suggest that this 'devolution' would not be granted willingly because it would undermine the role of the education system in reproducing the relations of production. It is critical for dominant elites for education to continue its role as an ISA and to deny that racial problems actually exist in any major sense.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

New Zealand education policy has been formed from a combination of nineteenth century liberalism which accepts limited intervention in the education process to ensure equality and the demands of a capitalist economy which has relied on education providing a selective function to aid market processes. In a recession, it is this latter function which is emphasised so that vocational training is declared to be crucial and the system is governed by competition according

to universalistic criteria. These are rationalisations which conceal the actual basis of selection and encourage the subservience of education to the demands of a depressed economy. Increasingly, the market is held to be the most efficient regulator. In this climate, debates about multiculturalism and education make little sense without giving major consideration to the issue of power, and specifically, the power of minority groups to make and carry through decisions within the institutional structure of society. The critical area for New Zealand is in those urban schools where there are a majority of Polynesian students, many of whom are going to leave school without any or adequate academic qualifications with the obvious implications this has for labour market participation. These schools are going to be the site of confrontation, and, if the last section is correct, in the formation of the political allegiances and philosophies which will characterise Polynesian politics. If Althusser is correct, however, the State will be committed to preserving the role of the school as an ISA and an important part of the of the mechanism for reproducing labour power. Polynesian options are going to be limited, particularly if the dominant groups employ what Ranginui Walker has called the 'Pakeha veto' (New Zealand Listener, 31 August 1974) and back this with the considerable forces of the State. This prognosis is part of the 'fashionable pessimism' that Michael Young has referred to (St John-Brooks, 1980), but in the discussion of mutliculturalism, it is salutory to remind ourselves that effective equality is constrained by the willingness of dominant groups to grant autonomy and to accede to power sharing.

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